Mercer Law Review
Volume 43
Number 2 Lead Articles I - The Legal
Implications of a Nation at War

Article 9

3-1992

The Beat Goes On: District Court Upholds Virginia Military
Institute's All-Male Admissions Policy in United States v. Virginia
Phillip Comer Griffeth

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Education Law Commons, and the Military, War, and Peace Commons

Recommended Citation
Griffeth, Phillip Comer (1992) "The Beat Goes On: District Court Upholds Virginia Military Institute's AllMale Admissions Policy in United States v. Virginia," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 43 : No. 2 , Article 9.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol43/iss2/9

This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

The Beat Goes On: District Court Upholds
Virginia Military Institute's All-Male
Admissions Policy in United States v.
Virginia
I.

INTRODUCTION

In United States v.Virginia,' the United States District Court for the
Western District of Virginia held that Virginia Military Institute
("VMI"), a state-supported college, can exclude women under its 152year-old admissions policy without violating the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 The court based its decision on the
United States Supreme Court's holding in Mississippi University for
Women v. Hogan.3 Applying the Hogan test, the district court held that
VMI's discrimination serves an important state educational objective by
enhancing the diversity of Virginia's overall education system and that
the exclusive admissions policy is substantially related to the achievement of this objective.' According to District Judge Jackson L. Kiser,
"VMI truly marches to the
beat of a different drummer, and I will permit
''
it to continue to do so. e
This Casenote begins with a discussion of the development of the intermediate scrutiny test employed by the Supreme Court. Next, it provides
a brief discussion of the VMI experience, along with the facts and procedural history of United States v. Virginia. An examination of the present
controversy follows, including arguments presented by both sides and a
discussion of the court's opinion. The Casenote concludes with an analysis of the decision.
II.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY TEST

The Supreme Court first alluded to heightened scrutiny for genderbased classifications in Reed v. Reed,6 although the exact test applied by
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

766 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Va. 1991).
Id. at 1408.
458 U.S. 718 (1982).
766 F. Supp. at 1413, 1415.
Id. at 1415.
404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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the Court was somewhat unclear. In Reed the Court struck down an
Idaho statute that preferred males over females as administrators of estates.7 The Court reasoned that the statute's different treatment of applicants on the basis of sex "establishe[d] a classification subject to scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause."' Because the statute did not advance the "objective of reducing the workload on probate courts" in a
way that survived this heightened scrutiny,9 the Court concluded that
"the arbitrary preference established in favor of males" violated the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 10
In Frontiero v. Richardson," the Court revisited the heightened scrutiny question in a due process context. The Court struck down a federal
statutory scheme that determined a spouse's dependency status based on
the gender of the armed forces member claiming dependency benefits."2
Justice Brennan, joined by three other justices,"8 agreed with the claimant's contention that "classifications based upon sex, like classifications
based upon race, alienage, and national origin, are inherently suspect and
must therefore be subjected to close judicial scrutiny." 1' Brennan noted
that "sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic,"'15
that "the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society,"" and that "Congress has itself manifested
an increasing sensitivity to sex-based classifications."' 7 Accordingly, gender-based classifications "are inherently suspect, and must therefore be
subjected to strict judicial scrutiny." s The statutory scheme failed under
this "stricter standard of review." 9 Brennan also dismissed the Government's claim that the statute should be upheld because it furthered administrative convenience. 20 "[W]hen we enter the realm of 'strict judicial
scrutiny,' there can be no doubt that 'administrative convenience' is not a
shibboleth, the mere recitation of which dictates constitutionality. ' "
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id' at

74.
75.
76,
74.

1t. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 678-79 (plurality opinion).
Justices Douglas, White, and Marshall joined Justice Brennan's opinion.
411 U.S. at 682 (plurality opinion),
Id. at 686.
Id.
Id. at 687.

18. Id. at 688.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 690.
21. Id.
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However, gender-based classifications failed to receive strict scrutiny in
Frontierobecause of Justice Stewart's opinion. Stewart cast the fifth vote
to strike down the statute. In his one-sentence opinion, Stewart simply
concurred in the judgment, "agreeing that the statutes . . . work an invidious discrimination in22 violation of the Constitution" and citing the
Court's decision in Reed.
In 1976, the Court finally decided upon the appropriate scrutiny level
to apply to gender-based classifications and outlined the intermediate
scrutiny test in Craig v. Boren.23 In Craig the Court held that an
Oklahoma statute which "prohibits the sale of 'nonintoxicating' 3.2%
beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18...
equal protection of
constitutes a denial to males 18-20 years of age of the 24
the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Especially important was the majority's characterization of the scrutiny
level established by previous cases.25 According to the Court's opinion in
Craig, "classifications by gender must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives."" The Court accepted the State's objective of protecting public health and safety, particularly traffic safety, as an important objective,
but held that the gender-based classification was not substantially related
to that objective based on the statistics presented by the State. 7
"[P]roving broad sociological propositions by statistics is a dubious business, and one that inevitably is in tension with the normative philosophy
that underlies the Equal Protection clause."" The dissenters in Craigobjected to the extension of any heightened scrutiny in the equal protection
area.2 According to Justice Rehnquist, the statute "need pass only the
'rational basis' equal protection analysis," which he found the statute
survived.30
22. Id. at 691 (Stewart, J., concurring).
23. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
24. Id. at 192.
25. Id. at 197-98 (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S.

498 (1975); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975)).
26. Id. at 197.
27. Id. at 199-200.
28. Id. at 204.
29. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist each filed dissenting opinions.
30. 429 U.S. at 217-18 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Under the rational basis or rational
relationship test, the statute is unconstitutional "'only if the classification rests on grounds
wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective .... A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.' "Id.
at 222 (quoting McGowan v.Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961)). In this case, the
Oklahoma legislature's action was "neither irrational nor arbitrary." Id. at 227.
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The Court further refined the intermediate scrutiny test in Michael M.

v. Sonoma County Superior Court.3 ' The Court upheld a California statutory rape law even though the statute effectively made "men alone criminally liable for the act of sexual intercourse."'' 3 Justice Rehnquist again
showed his distaste for the Court's test in Craig when he wrote the opinion for the plurality in Michael M.33 Although he emphasized that "the

traditional minimum rationality test takes on a somewhat 'sharper focus'
when gender-based classifications are challenged,' '1 4 Rehnquist carefully
'

characterized the Craig approach as a "restate[ment of] the test.' 3
According to the plurality, the Court "has consistently upheld statutes
where the gender classification is not invidious, but rather realistically
reflects the fact that the sexes are not similarly situated in certain circumstances."8 6 In applying the intermediate scrutiny test, the Court held
that "the State has a strong interest in preventing .

..

[illegitimate]

pregnancy"'" and that the statutory rape statute "is sufficiently related to
the State's objectives to pass constitutional muster."' 8
The Court also rejected the petitioner's contention that the law was
"impermissibly underinclusive and must, in order to pass judicial scrutiny, be broadened so as to hold the female as criminally liable as the
male."'3 The question is not, according to the Court, "whether the statute
is drawn as precisely as it might have been, but whether the 0line chosen
by the . . . [1]egislature is within constitutional limitations."'1
The dissenters in Michael M. objected primarily to the plurality's application of the second prong of the Craig test, that is, whether the statutory means is substantially related to the State's objective."' According to
Justice Brennan's opinion, because "the State ha[d] not shown that [the
present law] .

.

. [was] any more effective than a gender-neutral law

would be in deterring minor females from engaging in sexual intercourse,"
the State had not proven the substantial relationship that intermediate
scrutiny requires."2
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

450 U.S. 464 (1981).
Id. at 466 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 465-66.
Id. at 468.
Id. at 469.
Id.
Id. at 470.
Id. at 472-73.
Id. at 473.
Id.
Id. at 488-89 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 496.
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In 1982, the decision of Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan'8
created new dimensions for the intermediate scrutiny test. In Hogan the
Court held that "a state statute that excludes males from enrolling in a
state-supported professional nursing school violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Plaintiff was a male registered
nurse who applied for admission to the Mississippi University for
Women's School of Nursing. The school denied him admission because of
his sex. Plaintiff sued the school, claiming that the single-sex admissions
policy violated the Equal Protection Clause. Applying the rational relationship test, the district court denied plaintiff's request for injunctive
and declaratory relief and entered summary judgment for the State.4
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the district court erred in
applying the rational relationship test in its analysis.' The court of appeals applied the intermediate scrutiny test and found that although "the
State has a significant interest in providing educational opportunities for
all its citizens, . . . the State had failed to show that providing a unique
educational opportunity for females, but not'for males, bears a substantial relationship to that interest.""' The court also rejected the State's
argument that Title IX of the Civil Rights Act expressly authorized the
school's continuance of the single-sex admissions policy.' 8 The Supreme
Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals."
The Court began by outlining the burden of proof that a state must
meet: "[T]he party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies individuals
on the basis of their gender must carry the burden of showing an 'exceed'
ingly persuasive justification' for the classification." 50
The Court then reaffirmed the use of the intermediate scrutiny test in this area and gave
specific guidelines on how the test should be applied.51 "Care must be
taken in ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself reflects
archaic and stereotypic notions."5 2

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

458 U.S. 718 (1982).
Id. at 719.
Id. at 720-21.
Id. at 721.
Id. at 722.
Id. at 723. The State claimed that Congress "expressly had authorized [Mississippi

University for Women's School of Nursing] to continue its single-sex admissions policy by
exempting public undergraduate institutions that traditionally have used single-sex admis-

sions policies from the gender discrimination prohibition of Title IX." Id. at 722. See 20
U.S.C. § 1681(a)(5) (1978).

49. 458 U.S. at 723.
50. Id. at 724.
51. Id. at 724-25.
52. Id. at 725.
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The State asserted that the primary purpose for the admissions policy
survived the first prong of the intermediate scrutiny test because the policy "compensates for discrimination against women and, therefore, constitutes educational affirmative action."3 The Court rejected this argument
and noted that the policy does quite the opposite by "perpetuat[ing] the
stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively woman's job."" The Court
also found that the policy was not substantially related to the proposed
governmental objective." As the court of appeals had done, the Court
quickly disposed of the State's argument based on the Title IX exemption provision."
The dissenters in Hogan 7 lamented that a rigid application of intermediate scrutiny in areas in which it does not belong dampens the "liberating spirit" of the Equal Protection Clause and leads to conformity." According to Justice Powell,.a state does not "transgress[] the Constitution
when-within the context of a public system that offers a diverse range of
campuses, curricula, and educational alternatives-it seeks to accommodate the legitimate personal preferences of those desiring the advantages
of an all-women's college."" Although Powell would have applied the rational-relationship test, he contended that the admissions policy also survived intermediate scrutiny.60

III.

THE

VMI

EXPERIENCE

Understanding the district court's reasoning in United States v. Virginia1l requires a brief description
of VMI's history, its mission, and its
unique educational method.0s
VMI was founded in 1839 by an act of the Virginia Legislature. The
founders had two models in mind for VMI: the United States Military
Academy at West Point and an engineering school in Paris begun during
the French Revolution. e 3 VMI cadets fought for the Confederacy in the
53. Id. at 727.
54. Id. at 729.
55. Id. at 730..
56. Id. at 732-33.
57. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun each filed dissenting opinions. Justice
Powell filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Rehnquist joined.
58. 458 U.S. at 734-35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 741 (Powell, J., dissenting).
59. 458 U.S. at 739-40 (Powell, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 742.
61. 766 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Va. 1991).
62. This Casenote only attempts to provide the reader with enough information about
VMI as is necessary to understand the district court's analysis. The court presents detailed
findings of fact in a 29-page Appendix to its Memorandum Opinion. See id. at 1415-43.
63. Id. at 1427.
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Civil War, and General Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson was an early professor, teaching philosophy and artillery tactics. 4 Today, the school offers
undergraduate degrees in liberal arts, science, and engineering, yet still
maintains its commitment to military service.6 Since 1842, almost 14,000
VMI alumni have served in the armed forces during wartime.66
Virginia's fifteen state-supported, four-year colleges enroll over 158,000
students annually. VMI enrolls approximately 1,300 of these students, all
of whom are men." Students have several reasons for coming to VMI,
including the "rigor of the experience," the desire for better "work habits
or self-discipline," and the recommendation of the school by another who
attended (their father, for example)."
According to the Mission Study Committee of the VMI Board of
Visitors:
[TIhe mission of the Virginia Military Institute [is] to produce educated
and honorable men, prepared for the varied work of civil life, imbued
with love of learning, confident in the functions and attitudes of leadership, possessing a high sense of public service, advocates of the American
democracy and free enterprise system, and ready as citizen-soldiers to
defend their country in time of national peril. 6'
VMI seeks to achieve this mission by focusing on five basic areas: "(1)
education, both general and specialized; (2) military training; (3) mental
and physical
discipline; (4) character development; and (5) leadership
' 70
training.
The educational method at VMI is based on the adversative model.
The model's objective is to "creat[e] doubt about previous beliefs and
experiences in order to create a mindset conducive to the values VMI
attempts to impart."'17 VMI achieves this objective by emphasizing
"[p]hysical rigor, mental stress, absolute equality of treatment, absence of
privacy, minute regulation of behavior, and indoctrination in desirable
values.'7 2 The adversative. model at VMI has three distinctive features:
the rat line, the class system, and the dyke system."
64. Bill Lohmann, On Trial, NAT'L L.J., May 6, 1991, at 8.
65. 766 F. Supp. at 1424.
66. Id. at 1427.
67. Id. at 1419. During the fall of 1989, 72,819 men and 85,441 women were enrolled in
the 15 schools. VMI enrolled 1,312 men. Id.
68. Id. at 1426.
69. Id. at 1425 (quoting the final report of the Mission Study Committee of the VMI
Board of Visitors issued May 16, 1986).
70. Id. at 1426.
71. Id. at 1421.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1422-23.
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For their first seven months at VMI, entering cadets are subjected to
"indoctrination, egalitarian treatment, rituals (such as walking the rat
line), minute regulation of individual behavior, frequent punishments,
and [the] use of privileges to support desired behaviors."' 74 Rat line activities also include "stoop runs, fifteen-minute running and calisthenic
events, rifle runs, training marches, and the like." VMI believes that
cadets who survive the rat line develop "a sense of class solidarity in addition to individual responsibility."7
The class system is designed to replace in the cadets what the rat line
strips away. The system is an organized structure of peer pressure, with
each class having certain responsibilities. Seniors at VMI (the first class)
provide overall leadership and are heavily involved in the supervision of
the rat line. Members of the third class are disciplinarians for the rat line.
Through the dyke system, almost a subsystem of the class system, first
classmen serve as mentors to the rats.7 Rats typically shine the shoes of
the first classmen and provide them with wake-up calls. In return, the
first classmen teach the rats the ropes, indoctrinating them with VMI's
history and traditions. Both the rats and the first classmen call each other
dykes." According to VMI, the dyke system creates' 9 "cross-class bonding
and provides a model for leadership and support."
The barracks also play a very important role in the VMI experience. All
cadets must live in the barracks for all four years.
Each class is assigned a floor in the barracks, which has four floors.
[O]pen windows on the doors in the
There is a total lack of privacy ....
barracks ... enable the officer in charge to walk around and check in
each room at night and see every cadet without anything being hidden
The barracks are stark and unattractive ....

Ventilation is poor. Fur-

niture is unappealing. A principal object of these conditions is to induce
stress.8

VMI's emphasis' on the barracks experience distinguishes it not only from
most colleges in America, but from the service academies as well.8
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
Bell's
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 1422.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1422-23.
Interview with Lloyd N. Bell, VMI Class of 1989, in Macon, Ga. (Dec. 4, 1991). Mr.
grandfather and great-grandfather were also VMI graduates.
766 F. Supp. at 1423.
Id. at 1423-24.
Id.
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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 21, 1989, in response to a female high school student's written complaint of discrimination by VMI, the United States Justice Department wrote to the Acting Superintendent of VMI requesting information on admission policies and, practices.8 2 The Superintendent responded
on April 28 by saying that VMI had never admitted women.03 On January
30, 1990, the Justice Department notified Virginia's Governor and the
President of the VMI Board of Visitors ("Board") that the admission policies violated both the Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment
and gave VMI until February 20, 1990 to develop and implement a remedial plan. 4
Fifteen days before the deadline, the Board's President advised the
Justice Department that VMI stood behind its current policy. The Commonwealth of Virginia ("Commonwealth") filed a pre-emptive suit
against the United States on behalf of VMI.85 The VMI Foundation Inc.
("Foundation") also filed a complaint for judgment and injunctive relief
against the United States." On March 1, the United States moved to dismiss the Commonwealth's suit" and filed its own complaint pursuant to
Title IV of the Civil Rights Act. 8 The named defendants in this suit were
the Commonwealth; the Governor; VMI, its Superintendent and Board;
and the State Council of Higher Education ("Council"), its members and
Director."
The defendants filed their answer and counterclaim on March 26.8 One
month later, the Foundation moved to consolidate the three pending suits
and later amended its complaint to include the VMI Alumni Association
("Association") as a plaintiff. Both plaintiffs moved to intervene in the
United States' suit on June 5.01 On October 19, the Commonwealth voluntarily dismissed its action against the United States without
prejudice."
82. United States' Proposed Findings of Fact and Proposed Conclusions of Law at 1,
United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Va. 1991) (No. 90-0126-R) [hereinafter

United States' Proposed Findings).
83, Id.
84. Id. at 1-2.
85. Id. at 2.
86.

Id. at 4.

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 2.
Id. at 3. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 (1988).
United States' Proposed Findings, supra note 82, at 3.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 2-3.
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On November 2, the United States filed a motion to dismiss the Foundation's suit, which the court granted. The court also granted discretionary intervention to the Foundation and Association and granted an earlier motion by the Commonwealth to dismiss the Council as a
defendant."' Later that month, the Virginia Attorney General's Office
sought permission from the court to withdraw from the case, alleging a
conflict of interest in representing the Commonwealth and the Governor,
who had opposed the admissions policy.e4 The court granted this motion
(conditionally on November 30, finally on December 10) and appointed
substitute counsel."
On January 10, 1991, the Commonwealth filed a Motion for Stay of
Liability Proceedings Against Defendant Commonwealth of Virginia Subject to Commonwealth's Agreement to be Bound for Purposes of this Proceeding by the Ultimate Ruling on Liability. In February, the court
granted the Commonwealth's motion to be bound and bifurcated the action for trial. The court would decide the liability issue first. Two weeks
before trial, the Governor filed a Motion in Limine asking the court that
he not be required to testify. The court granted his motion, and the trial
on the liability issue was held during the first two weeks of April."
V. THE

PRESENT CONTROVERSY

A. Arguments by VMI Defendants
VMI defendants offered two governmental purposes for the exclusionary admissions policy, each of which, they claimed, survived the Hogan
test: "The 'citizen-soldier' objective focuses on VMI as a singular institution, while the 'diversity' objective reflects a system-wide perspective."91
Because VMI's mission "emphasiz[es] character development and preparation for civilian and military leadership," s and because the Board of
Visitors acted on behalf of the State of Virginia in defining this mission,
the citizen-soldier rationale serves an important governmental objective.9
The defendants contended that the "admission of female cadets would
undermine fulfillment of its existing, indisputably valid mission."1 0
93. Id. at 4.
94. Id. at 4-5.
95. Id. at 5.
96. Id. at 5-6.
97. VMI Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at preface,
United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Va. 1991) (No. 90-0126-R) [hereinafter
VMI Defendants' Proposed Findings).
98. Id. at 114.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 115.
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Therefore, the relationship between the policy and the citizen-soldier objective is not only substantial, but compelling. 10 1
The defendants also argued that VMI serves an important governmental objective by enhancing system-wide diversity in Virginia's education
system,102 This contribution comes in two different ways: "by providing
an opportunity for single-sex education and by providing a distinctive
program of military-style education."103 The defendants relied on Justice
Blackmun's dissent in Hogan, in which he commented on the tension between diversity and conformity in higher education. 1 ' Because VMI contributes to diversity by virtue of its single-sex status, excluding women is
more than a substantially related means; it is a means absolutely necessary to achieving that goal. 03
The defendants distinguished the Court's holding in Hogan. First, they
contended that Justice O'Connor, in writing for the majority, did not
challenge Justice Powell's premise in his dissent or the importance he
placed on diversity. 100 Second, they distinguished the case on its facts.
The facts that Justice O'Connor emphasized, showing that admitting men
to nursing classes would not seriously hinder the classroom setting, are
simply not present in this case according to the defendants. In fact, key
elements of the VMI experience "would be fundamentally altered, and
the distinctive ends of the system would be thwarted, if VMI were forced
to admit females."107
B. Arguments by the United States
According to the United States, "this is not a complicated case ....
Virginia Military Institute (VMI) is a public, state-supported undergraduate institution that does not admit women." 0 3 Therefore, the admissions policy clearly violates the Equal Protection Clause and Title IV of
the Civil Rights Act.1 '
The United States contended that VMI fails the first prong of the intermediate scrutiny test by not offering any exceedingly persuasive governmental interest for the admissions policy. The interest in promoting
diversity in Virginia's education system is simply unpersuasive. 110 "The
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 116.
Id.
Id. at 117.
United States' Proposed Findings, supra note 82, at 7.
Id. at 111. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 (1988).
United States' Proposed Findings, supra note 82, at 111.
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evidence is clear that diversity would be furthered, not denigrated, by the
admission of women to VMI. The VMI educational experience is unique,
independent of gender, and the admission of women would merely substitute one form of diversity for another.""'
Perhaps one of the Justice Department's stronger arguments regarding
the diversity rationale was that the defendants were merely making a
bootstrapping argument.
The justification for an exclusion of women must rest on something
more than the exclusion itself. Here, however, Defendants [sic] diversity
rationale offers only the classification itself-i.e., a desire for a single sex
school-as the reason ....
...Excluding a group will always make the 2institution "different"
from institutions that do not exclude the group."
The United States claimed that even if the policy produced certain educational benefits in Virginia, the evidence was not sufficient to survive
Hogan's "exceedingly persuasive" mandate."3
The United States also found unpersuasive the proposed citizen-soldier
rationale offered by VMI as an important governmental objective."' The
evidence "proves that women can be citizen-soldiers, that they are capable of succeeding at VMI, and that their admission will neither harm
VMI's great tradition nor unravel the fabric of the VMI experience."'
The United States especially relied upon the admission of women to
the federal service academies for the argument that women could succeed
in VMI's mission of producing citizen soldiers.1 "[T]he experience of female soldiers in Operation Desert Storm demonstrates plainly that
women satisfy the soldier portion of VMI's mission. And, no argument
has been made or' 7 could be made that women have not had successful
'
civilian careers."
In addition, the United States contended that VMI failed to demonstrate any substantial relationship between the exclusionary admissions
policy and any of the alleged governmental objectives (the diversity rationale or the citizen-soldier rationale)." s Accordingly, the United States
asked the court to require VMI "to formulate, adopt, and fully and timely
implement a plan to remedy fully their discriminatory policies and prac111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

7.
115.
116.
8.
119-26.
120.
111, 118, 136.
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tices and to comply with the Fourteenth Amendment..., and to submit
119
this plan for review, response, and approval."
C. The Court's Opinion
After outlining the controversy, the court framed the issue in the case
to be "whether VMI's practice of excluding women can pass muster under
the equal protection clause, as glossed by the decisions of the Supreme
Court.""1 0 Judge Kiser then briefly discussed the court's basis for jurisdic1
tion, the procedural background, and the applicable standard of review. 2
The court derived the standard primarily from Supreme Court cases in
the higher education area, particularly the
Court's decision in Regents of
2
the University of California v. Bakke.
According to the Bakke standard, courts should defer to a university's
academic decisionmaking as part of the principle of academic freedom
implicit in the First Amendment's freedom of association.12 The freedom
to choose whom the school will admit is included in this right of academic
freedom.12 " The court noted that "other courts have extended the rationale of that decision to include the freedom to create different missions at
different state universities, in order to promote diverse educational opportunities within the state."'2 5 However, this deference is not absolute,
especially when the decisionmaking
"tend[s] to perpetuate unconstitu26
tional discrimination."

The court then presented an overview of sex discrimination in higher
education. 2 7 The court first summarized Kirstein v. Rector & Visitors of
the University of Virginia,'" in which plaintiffs challenged the University of Virginia's all-male admissions policy." 9 The court in Kirstein required Virginia to admit women at the University, but stopped short of
requiring coeducation at all of Virginia's colleges. 3
119. Id. at 136-37.
120. 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1408 (W.D. Va. 1991).
121. Id. at 1408-09.
122. Id. at 1409. See 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
123. 766 F. Supp. at 1409.
124. Id.
125. Id. (citing Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134, 137 (D.S.C. 1970) (three-judge
panel), affd, 401 U.S. 951 (1971) (per curiam); Ayers v. Allain, 914 F.2d 676, 687 (5th Cir.
1990) (en banc), cert. granted in part sub nom. United States v. Mabus, 111 S. Ct. 1579

(1991)).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1409-11.
128. 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970) (three-judge panel) (approving consent order).
129. 766 F. Supp. at 1409-10. See 309 F. Supp. at 185-86.
130. 766 F. Supp. at 1409-10. See 309 F. Supp. at 187.
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The court also discussed a Fourth Circuit decision, Williams v. McNair, ' in which the court upheld the denial of admission to male students by South Carolina's Winthrop College, a women's college.18 2 The
court in Williams reaffirmed the value of single-sex institutions in general. 133 The Supreme Court's intermediate scrutiny test was not applied
in either Kirstein or Williams because the Court had not yet articulated
the test.'"
Stating that Hogan "guides my decision in this case," Judge Kiser included a lengthy discussion of the Hogan case.'3" The court agreed that
the intermediate scrutiny test should govern its decision and that the defendants must show an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for the admissions policy.'8s However,
the court distinguished Hogan from the pres
sent case in three ways. 1
First, the court distinguished Hogan on its facts.'" The court noted
that according to the record in Hogan, admitting men "'does not affect
teaching style, . . would not affect the performance of the female nursing students, . . and that men in coeducational nursing schools do not
dominate the classroom.' "18 In the present case, "single gender education at the undergraduate level is beneficial to both males and females. ' 140 In addition, the admission of women, with the resulting accommodation of their needs, would "fundamentally" alter key aspects' 14of the
VMI educational system, particularly the "focus on barracks life. "
Second, the court evaluated the reasons offered in each case to establish an important governmental interest."' In Hogan the State's justification for the single-sex admissions policy was that the policy compensated
women for past discrimination-a justification that failed intermediate
scrutiny."143 "In contrast, diversity in education has been recognized both
judicially and by education experts as being a legitimate objective. The
sole way to attain single-gender diversity is to maintain a policy of admitting only one gender to an institution."'4
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144,

316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970) (three-judge panel), aff'd, 401 U.S. 951 (1971).
766 F. Supp. at 1410. See 316 F. Supp. at 138.
766 F. Supp. at 1410. See 316 F. Supp. at 137.
766 F. Supp. at 1410 n.5.
Id. at 1410.
Id. (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730 (1982)).
Id. at 1411.
Id.
Id. (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 731).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Third, the court noted that the plaintiff in Hogan resided in the town
in which the school was located and would have faced a "significant hardship" if forced to study his profession in. a different community. ' " That
result is simply not possible in the VMI case because all cadets must live
in the barracks.1 46 VMI does not offer a "close-to-home education" during
the academic year."17 In addition, VMI is not "deny[ing] the opportunity
to study any particular academic program to anyone,"148 because Virginia
Polytechnic Institute (VPI) offers the same courses as VMI, including
courses in military instruction.'
The court offered a "substantial body" of evidence to support its premise that single-sex education as a form of diversity independently survives constitutional scrutiny.110 "[Tihe opportunity to attend a single-sex
college is a valuable one, likely to lead to better academic and professional achievement.""' The court placed great weight on one study which
showed that students at single-sex colleges "become more academically
involved, interact with faculty frequently, show larger increases in intellectual self-esteem and are more satisfied with practically all aspects of
college experience."51 Justice Powell cited the same research in his dis3
sent in Hogan."5
The effect that admitting women would have on the VMI experience
"further reinforce[s]" the all-male policy's validity.' 5 4 The court gave several reasons why coeducation at VMI would be detrimental.' 66 Women on
the VMI campus would "distract male students from their studies," "increase pressures relating to dating," "alter the adversative environment,"
and "add a new set of stresses on the cadets."!" Coeducation would also
necessitate different physical education requirements." 57 The court noted
in empirical evidence, and not based
that these effects are "well-founded
s
on an archaic stereotype."'
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1411-12.
151. Id. at 1412.
152. Id. See ALEXANDER ASTIN, FOUR CRITICAL YEARS (1977).
153. 766 F. Supp. at 1412. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 73839 (1982).
154. 766 F. Supp. at 1412,
155. Id. at 1412-13.
156. Id.
157. Id, at 1413.

158.. Id.
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Accordingly, the court found that "both VMI's single-sex status and its

distinctive educational method represent legitimate contributions to diversity in the Virginia higher education system, and that excluding
women is substantially related to this mission." ' " Therefore, the defendants met
their burden under the intermediate scrutiny test outlined in
10
Hogan. 6
The court did highlight certain factors that could have been influential
under a different set of facts. First, the United States filed the present
suit on behalf of one potential applicant."' The court conceded that
"some women, at least, would want to attend the school if they had the
opportunity. '"1' 2 However, the court interpreted Hogan to require the
consideration of the policy's constitutionality "without regard to the size
of the available applicant pool." 1 3
Second, the United States sought to require the admission of women to
VMI, not to require Virginia to establish a state-supported college for females. 16"Because the latter was not the relief sought by the plaintiff, the
court could not address that issue in this lawsuit. 1"5The court noted that
what plaintiff really wants-admission to the VMI experience-would be
virtually impossible if women were admitted.1 "0"Even if the female could
physically and psychologically undergo the rigors of the life of a male cadet, her introduction into the process would change it. Thus, the very
experience she sought would no longer be available."1 7"
VI.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

Justice Blackmun's observation in his dissent in Hogan seemed almost
to predict the present litigation:
[lit is easy to go too far with rigid rules in this area of claimed sex discrimination, and to lose-indeed destroy-values that mean much to
some people ....
...

[The Court's] ruling .

.

. places in constitutional jeopardy any

state-supported educational institution that confines its student body in
any area to members of one sex ....
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
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Id.
Id.
Id. at 1414.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1414, 1415.
Id. at 1414.
Id.

168. 458 U.S. 718, 734 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Even VMI's self-study committee seemed to acknowledge the inevitable:
"'within the next decade-particularly as the grim years of 1992-1995 approach-the exigencies of declining enrollment (or the mandate of a federal court armed with a legal precedent, already extant) may make the
admission of women unavoidable.' "10

The Justice Department, armed with the Hogan decision, may have
viewed the present suit as an easy case, but Judge Kiser welcomed the
challenge. His opinion resulted in an impressive defense of single-sex education in general and the VMI experience in particular. However, although the court provides an interesting application of the intermediate
scrutiny test, the opinion loses much of its persuasiveness by ignoring
many of the Justice Department's toughest arguments.
The court's reliance on the Kirstein and Williams decisions " to establish the benefits of single-sex education seems to be misplaced, although
the court finds valuable prose in those opinions. The court even acknowledged that the Supreme Court had not yet developed the intermediate
scrutiny test when these decisions were written. '7 The court also failed to
attack directly the Justice Department's primary argument: because VMI
is a state-supported institution, which women want to attend, the Equal
Protection Clause requires coeducation. The court extols the benefits of
single-sex education on page after page-benefits that few would
dis1 2
pute-but the court de-emphasizes VMI's role as a public school.
The court's acceptance of VMI's diversity rationale has much support
in the dissent in Hogan, 7 " but the court fails to present much more legal
support for this governmental objective. The court asserts that this objective "has been recognized both judicially and by education experts,"" 4
but Judge Kiser loads the opinion more with expert opinion than with
in which the Supreme Court outjudicial authority post-Craig v. Boren,
175
lined the intermediate scrutiny test.
Judge Kiser also never refutes, at least not through a reasoned analysis,
the Justice Department's arguments that admitting women will further
diversity and that VMI simply offers the classification itself to justify the
policy.' 7 Instead, he merely concludes that the only way to achieve diver169. United States' Proposed Findings, supra note 82, at 24.
170. See supra notes 128-34 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
172. VMI receives nine million dollars annually from state funds, approximatbly onethird of its budget. Felicity Barringer, Banning of Women at Military College Is Upheld,
N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1991, at AIO.
173. Judge Kiser cites the dissents in Hogan, primarily that of Justice Powell, throughout his opinion. See 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1410-13 (W.D. Va. 1991).
174. 766 F. Supp. at 1411.
175. See 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
176. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
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sity in Virginia's higher education system is to keep women out of
VMI.17
Judge Kiser's opinion has, at the very least, sparked additional interest
in the continuing debate over women's role in the military. In particular,
public reaction to the opinion reflected the irony of the decision in light
of the role played by women during Operation Desert Storm.' 7 Said Ellen Vargyas of the National Women's Law Center, "This comes on the
heels of the Persian Gulf war, where women performed admirably, where
women were killed, where women were prisoners ....
And this court
says blatant discrimination against women is all right."'177 A New York
Times editorial echoed this distaste: "Judge Kiser's 21-page rhapsody on
the merits of single-sex education ... [is] poorly timed. The Persian Gulf
war showed the capability and potential of women in battle ....
Virginia Military Institute may indulge its pride in uniqueness, but not at
taxpayer expense. Let the college buy its own drum."6 0
Not everyone was displeased with Judge Kiser's opinion. In a statement
issued by the president of the Citadel, the nation's only other state-supported, all-male school, Lieutenant General Claudius E. Watts said, "I
can tell you that a very dark cloud has been lifted from VMI and The
Citadel.' ' 8 1 Another writer also felt that Judge Kiser made the right
move:
Talk about timing. In the same week that Congress considers the
thorny issue of women in combat comes news of a federal judge's ruling
that all-male Virginia Military Institute can stay that way.
(..hilf common sense prevails (which is never a certainty) the VMI
decision will stand and Congress will leave well enough alone.
Why? Because, while men and women are indeed equals, you simply
cannot ignore the fact that there are differences between the sexes."'
The court's opinion may also signal a new era in the area of equal protection in higher education-an era in which history and tradition receive
more weight in the intermediate scrutiny analysis. VMI defendants did
well to frame their governmental objective in terms of educational diver-

177. 766 F. Supp. at 1415.
178. "About 6 percent of the more than 500,000 U.S. troops deployed in Operation De-

sert Storm (were] women. Women compose about 11 percent of the entire U.S. military."
Carolyn Click, VMI Supporters Win With 'Case Pending' Arguments, UPI, Jan. 31, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
179. Barringer, supra note 172.
180. Wrong Gray Line, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1991, at A24.
181. Joyce Price, VMI Decision Outrages Women, WASH. TIMES, June 18, 1991, at A9.
182. Ed Foster-Simeon, Sexes Equal But Still Different, WASH. TIMES, June 20, 1991, at.
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sity.1 98 Seizing upon the diversity and conformity language used in Justice
Powell's dissent in Hogan,'8' the defendants set the stage for a constitutional battle that they could very well win before the Supreme Court,
which has
become a much different battleground in the decade since
85
Hogan.
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183. In fact, Virginia's Attorney General acknowledged that "'the educational diversity
argument was the only viable case that could be made on behalf of the all-male policy at the
Institute.'" United States' Proposed Findings, supra note 82, at 118-19 (quoting Virginia
Attorney General's Statement at 2 (11/27/90)).
184. Interestingly, former Justice Lewis Powell is a native Virginian. See Hogan, 458
U.S. at 737 n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting).
185. Four of the justices who decided Hogan are no longer on the Court. Justices Brennan and Marshall joined with Justices O'Connor, White, and Stevens in the majority's opinion. Justices Burger and Powell dissented. Therefore, with new Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
Souter, and Thomas, VMI defendants could conceivably get the necessary votes to succeed
on their diversity argument.

